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Naturalizing Gestell? 
An Essay on Heidegger and Leroi-Gourhan 
 
Yet it is above all for the sake of speech that nature has added 
hands to our body. 
Gregory of Nyssa, Treatise on the Creation of Man 
 
1. Introduction1 
André Leroi-Gourhan, perhaps one of the most notable authors on technology in the 20th century, 
offers a naturalized account of the development of technology and language in Gesture and 
Speech. The emergence and evolution of tools and speech up to and including graphism, the first 
art or technique of inscription, are shown to be causally dependent on the hominid anatomy and, 
more generally, on the functional evolution of the facial and manual poles of animals. Moreover, 
his conception of graphism provides us with a way of thinking about the birth of Dasein 
simultaneously with the birth of Homo sapiens forty thousand years ago. But there is a limit to 
the possibility of naturalizing Dasein.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that graphism is a necessary ontic condition of possibility of the Gestell 
and, more broadly, of Dasein understood as the relation between being and the human being. 
This has two apparent implications:  
 
- The essence of technology names the disclosure of a world. But insofar as this is 
accomplished by a certain technique of inscription, the essence of technology is–contrary 
to what Heidegger suggests–something technological.  
- Since graphism is a stage in the process of hominization, which is itself a moment in the 
history of life on earth, and Dasein ontically depends on graphism, it is reasonable to 
assume that Dasein is a stage in the history of life on earth.  
 
This assumption trades on an ambiguity in the concept of life. Life refers to ontical processes 
such as physico-chemical mechanisms, the processes of natural selection, growth, functional 
development, etc. But it also refers to a movement that cannot be reduced to natural causes or 
translated in the terms of a naturalist discourse. Life is the movement of phenomenalization that 
Heidegger variously calls lighting (Lichtung), the setting-apart-from-each-other (Aus-einander-
setzung), or the worlding of the world. It detaches an entity from the background with which it 
was initially fused by detaching it against other entities. Life is a power that differentiates entities 
from an undifferentiated background and makes them appear by delimiting them against each 
other.  
 
If Dasein is a stage in the history of life on earth in one sense, there is another sense in which this 
history of life, understood as a complex of ontical processes, is the correlate of a techno-scientific 
attitude that presupposes the worlding of the world, life in the phenomenological sense. There is, 
in other words, an irreducible and originary (non-derivable) phenomenological sense in which 
life is experienced that makes an unrestrained naturalization of Dasein de jure impossible.  
 
In the next section, I draw on Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech to provide reasons in favor of 
Heidegger’s distinction between the human hand and the grasping organ of the animal in What is 
Called Thinking? against Derrida’s criticism of it in Geschlecht II. In section 3, I argue that 
bipedalism and graphism are necessary ontical conditions of possibility of Dasein. In section 4, I 
argue that the phenomenological sense of life that Leroi-Gourhan’s naturalist account of technics 
and language presupposes constitutes an unsurpassable limit in his discourse.  
 
2. The organ and the hand 
My aim in this section is to show that bipedalism justifies Heidegger’s assertion that there is an 
“abyss of essence” between the human hand and the grasping organ of the animal against 
Derrida’s critical remarks. This establishes the premise of the argument of section 3, which is 
that bipedalism and graphism are necessary ontical conditions of possibility of Dasein. This 
argument will motivate in turn the question addressed in section 4, whether Dasein can be 
considered a moment in the history of life on earth.  
 
Derrida organizes his critical commentary on Heidegger in Geschlecht II around the notorious 
remark in What is Called Thinking? that apes have organs that can grasp but they do not have 
hands.  
 
The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs–paws, claws or fangs–different 
by an abyss of essence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and be 
handy in achieving works of handicraft (WCT16).  
 
What constitutes the human hand in distinction from any kind of grasping organ is, in the first 
place, its relation to the handwork.  
 
Heidegger writes on the previous page that a true cabinetmaker makes himself “answer and 
respond above all to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood–to 
wood as it enters man’s dwelling with all the hidden richness of its nature.” This relation to wood 
is what sustains the Handwerk, just as the relation to stone is what sustains the craft of the 
sculptor. Her task is also to “free the figures slumbering in the stone” (Michelangelo). 
 
Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything but empty busywork, any 
occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business concerns (WCT 14-15).  
 
What is essential to the craft is its relation to nature, to the potentialities hidden in sound, colour, 
stone or wood. The true craft does not use up this material as happens in the production of a use 
value where it remains unobtrusive or inconspicuous. It exposes its qualities. It brings to light 
what remains dormant in nature and in the use value. The craft that distinguishes the human hand 
is the one that produces the work of art–the work that, as Aristotle says, completes what nature 
cannot complete.  
 
A being without hands not only has no relation to nature in this sense. It also cannot speak or 
write. Why do we write? Why do we draw or sketch (zeichnen)? Why does man produce figures, 
symbols, or signs with his hands? Presumably, Heidegger says hesitantly, because he is a sign, 
vermutlich weil der Mensch ein Zeichen ist (WCT 16). A sign? What kind of sign is he? 
Heidegger cites Hölderlin’s Mnemosyne that says that we are a sign that is not read, a sign that 
lacks an interpretation. Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos.   
 
A sign points to something. Yet we are a sign not because we are able to point to something with 
our finger or our words. Pointing is not something that we do on occasion. It is, rather, something 
that we are. Man first is man because and insofar as he points. He is the pointer (der Zeigende), 
Heidegger writes. He is the pointer because he inclines, in his essence, to what refuses to become 
present (versagt Ankunft). He points into what draws away, into what refuses to show itself. He 
inclines toward what, in drawing away, calls man to itself, what singles him out in his uniqueness 
or irreplaceability. What draws away or remains concealed does not leave us indifferent (at least 
insofar as we are aware of it as drawing away). It summons us; it calls on us to think of what has 
thus far been left in abeyance and hence of what is yet to be thought. But so long as what draws 
away has not (nicht) or not yet (noch nicht) been transposed into language, we remain an errant 
sign. We remain a sign that has not or not yet fulfilled its vocation (WCT 18).   
 
Man fulfils his vocation as a sign in thinking. By thinking, Heidegger means a thankful or 
grateful disposition toward what gathers itself in memory. This disposition is grateful because 
what gathers itself in memory is what is most thought-provoking, and the latter is what returns 
thought to its element. Yet what provokes thought the most is not only the fact that we are not yet 
thinking. It is the holy. Like death, the holy delineates the unsurpassable limit or horizon of 
thought (see WCT 145-147). 
 
Concerning thinking and the hand, Heidegger says the following: 
 
Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of 
thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the work of the hand is 
rooted in thinking. Therefore, thinking itself is man’s simplest, and for that reason 
hardest, handiwork, if it would be accomplished at its proper time (WCT 16-17).   
 
Derrida cites this passage from What is Called Thinking? and writes the following:  
 
The nerve of the argument seems to me reducible … to the assured opposition between 
giving and taking: man’s hand gives and gives itself, like thinking or like what gives itself 
to be thought and that we are still not thinking, whereas the organ of the ape or of man as 
a simple animal, indeed as an animal rationale, can only take, grasp, lay hold of the 
thing.  
 
But, Derrida adds, nothing is less assured “than the distinction between giving and taking, both in 
the Indo-European languages that we speak … and in the experience of an economy – symbolic 
or imaginary, conscious or unconscious” (Derrida 2008, 43).  
 
It is most likely true that the distinction between giving and taking is ambiguous and unreliable. 
But Heidegger’s text evokes a whole host of motifs when distinguishing between the human 
being and the animal–beginning with the movement of withdrawal, the notion of man as the 
pointer, handicraft production, thinking, memory, and thanking–motifs that are not reducible to 
the less-than-sure opposition between giving and taking.  
 
Derrida’s criticism becomes sharper and more perspicuous when he remarks that Heidegger’s 
statement that “Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands” (WCT 16), is 
dogmatic in form. It “presupposes an empirical or positive knowledge whose titles, proofs, and 
signs are never shown.” In addition, Heidegger takes “no account of a certain ‘zoological 
knowledge’ that grows, becomes differentiated and more refined regarding what is brought 
together under this so general and confused word ‘animality’” (Derrida 2008, 40-41). Since what 
Heidegger says of man takes on meaning and value by establishing an absolute opposition 
between the human and the animal, once the absoluteness of this limit is made questionable 
everything that Heidegger says of man, including of the name of “man,” becomes problematic.  
 
Is it true, as Derrida suggests, that a certain kind of zoological knowledge, one that is more 
“differentiated” and “refined” with regards to the concept of the animal, could make us doubt 
that apes have no hands? Isn’t Heidegger on to something when he draws an absolute opposition 
between the grasping organ of the ape and the human hand? Put differently, supposing an ape has 
hands, would it still be an ape and not rather a hominid?2  
 
Heidegger’s statement begins to sound less dogmatic once it is put in relation with the zoological 
and anthropological knowledge Leroi-Gourhan brings to bear in Gesture and Speech. 
 
Leroi-Gourhan tells us that the formula for the hominid in all its variations since the first erect 
creature two million years ago “is in fact different from the formula for monkeys and applies 
exclusively to the anthropoid family.” Its fundamental characteristic is skeletal adaptation to 
bipedal locomotion (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 61). Elsewhere, Leroi-Gourhan notes that a free hand 
during locomotion “almost necessarily implies a technical activity different from that of the 
apes.”  
 
Erect posture, short face, free hand during locomotion, and possession of movable 
implements–these are the truly fundamental criteria of humanity. The list includes none 
of the characteristics peculiar to monkeys (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 13). 
 
Reason or the intellect is conspicuously absent from this list as a criterion of humanity. The 
human adventure for Leroi-Gourhan begins with the feet and not with the head as in classical 
humanism.  
 
Leroi-Gourhan’s central idea is that the transition to bipedalism from quadrupedal life involves a 
restructuration of the skeletal frame of the living being and, correlatively, a redistribution of the 
functions of the forelimb and of the face. Quadrupedal creatures use their forelimbs for 
locomotion and their mouth for food capture and preparation and for attack and defense. Since 
bipedalism involves having free hands during locomotion, the transition to bipedalism brings 
about a transference, from the face to the hands, of the functions of food capture and preparation 
and of attack and defense. The acquisition of erect posture not only liberates the mouth for 
speech. It also makes possible the production and use of moveable implements.  
 
Bipedal locomotion implies the possession of hands. Since apes are not bipedal, they have no 
hands.  
 
Monkeys–all monkeys–are characterised by mixed quadrupedal and seated posture and 
by the adaptation of their feet to the conditions of life resulting therefrom; anthropoids, on 
the other hand, have the fundamental characteristic of mixed bipedal and seated posture, 
to which their foot in turn is closely adapted (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 75). 
 
To be sure, when Heidegger says that apes have no hands he does not mean that they are not 
bipedal. He means that they do not dwell in the element of thinking and language, that they have 
no relation with the holy, and, conversely, that the latter cannot be explained by reference to a 
grasping organ. The essence of the hand (das Wesen der Hand), Heidegger says, which includes 
thinking and language, remembrance and the holy, cannot be determined or derived from a 
bodily grasping organ (leibliches Greiforganen) (WCT 16). 
 
Nevertheless, if bipedalism entails the possession of hands and, consequently, the possibility of 
graphism–the hand that, in Heidegger’s words, zeichnet, sketches, draws or writes–then bipedal 
locomotion is a necessary ontical condition of possibility of man as the pointer, der Zeigende, of 
Dasein as the relation of being and man as a relation of call and response, of withdrawal and 
sign.  
 
In other words, Gesture and Speech, I want to suggest, constitutes a rich document for thinking 
of technology, beyond its Heideggerian conception as the modern understanding of being, as a 
necessary ontical condition of possibility of any understanding of being.3  
 
3. The grapheme 
In the last section I showed that bipedalism justifies the absolute opposition that Heidegger draws 
between the human hand and the grasping organ of the animal. In this section, I focus more 
closely on this notion of the hand and argue that it presupposes the possibility of graphism, which 
accounts in turn for the origin of Dasein. But since graphism is a moment in the history of life on 
earth, this suggests that Dasein is a moment of this history, too. In section 4, I show that such an 
unrestrained naturalized understanding of Dasein is not coherent. 
 
3.1 Gestell 
Technology, then, is an ambiguous phenomenon. In its essence, Heidegger insists, it is the 
epoché of being. Not the suspension of the natural attitude in transcendental phenomenology. It 
is the withdrawal of being or, more precisely, being understood as withdrawal, and the forgetting 
of this withdrawal.  
 
Being-as-withdrawal: The word being in the verbal sense refers to the way entities appear. Being 
means manifestation, presence, Anwesung. Now since this is not itself identifiable as an entity, 
Heidegger sometimes describes it as that which refuses to appear (as an entity), or as that which 
is present everywhere as self-veiled (see Section 4).  
 
Forgetting-of-being: The early Greek reflection on nature first thematized the appearing of the 
whole of entities. But the sense in which this appearing is other than an entity was not 
recognized. It was confused with an entity of sorts. The ontico-ontological difference, which is 
mirrored in language in the difference between the verbal and the nominal use of the word being, 
was from the start left in obscurity. Above all, Western metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche 
bears witness to a growing indifference to the ontico-ontological difference to the point where, in 
Nietzsche, being is regarded as “the last whisper of evaporating reality.”  
 
What defines the technological age is this total indifference to being as withdrawal, as no-thing. 
Indifference to the nothing, or total lack of questioning: that is how Heidegger describes 
modernity in Contributions to Philosophy: From The Event.        
 
This indifference is not nothing. It describes a singular relation between man and being, a 
relation of mutual challenge (Herausfordern). On the one hand, entities as a whole are 
challenged by man to manifest themselves against the horizon of what is calculable. They are 
challenged to appear as resource to be unlocked, exposed, transformed, stored, distributed, and as 
available for use. On the other hand, man is challenged by the entirety of entities, too. Entities 
“make a claim on us with respect to their aptness to be planned and calculated” (ID 35). Man is 
solicited in his being to secure entities as the material of his planning and calculation.  
 
The Gestell is this setup between man and being, the way they are set up in a mutual challenge or 
confrontation. This happens through the kind of activities that Heidegger captures in verbs that 
include the act of stellen, to put, place, impose, or posit (herstellen, vorstellen, bestellen, etc.). 
Man is made present as a subject for objects in this setup or, in late modernity, as a resource 
among a vast multiplicity of interlocking resources that are managed, surveyed, and secured for 
their yield of energy.4  
 
But I am not sure that this is all there is to technology, to what this word means. For if it is true 
that entities appear thanks to the hand through which there is thinking and thanking, 
remembrance and the holy, language and speech, and there is no hand without the possibility of 
graphism, then there is no appearing, no setup between man and being, no Gestell, without the 
possibility of this technology, too.  
 
Accordingly, we will have to acknowledge that there will have been no essence of technology, 
that is, no Gestell understood as a particular relation between being and the human being, without 
the possibility of writing. Contrary to what Heidegger supposes, then, that this relation between 
being and the human being is originary, that is, not reducible to or derivative from the 
instruments, arts, or techniques that we find in the world around us, we will have to say that the 
Gestell depends for its condition of possibility on a particular technique or art of inscription.  
 
3.2 Graphism 
Now the hand does not merely disclose, through the work of art, the potentialities dormant in 
nature. Something is present or at hand if it is graspable or comprehensible, if it can be taken in 
hand by the understanding. This means that, since the presence (Anwesen) of what is present is 
equivalent to its being (Sein), to be comprehensible as a thing that subsists on its own or as an 
item of use, Vorhandensein and Zuhandensein, which are two modes of presence of entities, 
constitute two modes of being. At the same time, the hand also reaches out to the other. It 
receives the other’s welcome in its palm, or it extends itself to the other in prayer and 
supplication. The hand institutes the mode of being of the other, the manner of presence of both 
the other human and the divine. Heidegger writes in the Parmenides lecture:  
 
Through the hand occur both prayer and murder, greeting and thanks, oath and signal (P 
80). 
  
Heidegger adds that the hand appears as hand wherever there is disclosure and concealment (Die 
Hand west nur als Hand, wo Entbergung und Verbergung ist).  
 
Now there is no hand in this sense without language. The connection between the hand and 
language is not that of the gesture that accompanies and expresses the spoken word. Heidegger 
writes that the hand sprang forth from and with the word (Nur aus dem Wort und mit dem Wort 
ist die Hand entstprungen). 
 
Man does not ‘have’ hands, but the hand holds the essence of man, because the word as 
the essential realm of the hand is the essential ground of man (P 80).  
 
If having a language and having hands are contemporaneous with each other, and the human 
being is the figure of this contemporaneity, then does the withdrawal of the hand from the realm 
of the written word, which Heidegger will emphasize in his critique of the mechanization of 
writing, signify the disappearance of man, the evanescence of its ground (Dasein)?5  
 
What is meant by the generic das Wort? Heidegger refers to it as that which is drawn 
(eingezeichnete), as what shows itself to the gaze (dem Blick sich zeigende). The word is the 
written word (geschriebene Wort). The word as writing, Heidegger continues, is handwriting. 
Das Wort als die Schrift aber ist die Handschrift (P 81).    
 
This valorization of writing is unique in Heidegger’s texts. It establishes a relation between 
being, writing, the hand, and the face–as if Heidegger is saying that being, the disclosure of 
entities, has always already been inscribed on a surface for the eyes to see long before being 
uttered in speech or the logos, that the first figure drawn by the hand of the first scribe, the first 
graphic symbol, accomplishes a revelation of entities in relation to which orality is a response, 
and that, in addition, there is an inherent materiality to being, the materiality of the written sign, 
and a spatiality to it, too.  
 
If Handschrift names the essence of language, das Wort, if the primordial connection between 
being and man passes through language as writing, then it cannot simply signify what is 
ordinarily understood by that word: handwriting, writing with a pen or pencil as opposed to with 
a typewriter or computer, the unique style or character of a person’s writing as opposed to the 
uniformity of the typed word. The term must be taken in a sufficiently undetermined sense to 
include both painting and graphism, non-phonetic and non-linear forms of inscription, the 
prehistoric forms of writing or art on cave walls from the Magdalenian period, for instance, 
which follow a radial pattern, according to Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 196), as well as phonetic and 
linear forms of writing that have characterised the history of writing in the West and Middle East 
since the Sumerian writing system five thousand years ago.  
 
In another and more restricted sense, Heidegger is talking of a form of writing that is exclusively 
for the eyes or gaze (Blick) rather than one that is for the voice, a form of writing, therefore, that 
produces graphic symbols rather than phonic glyphs. That is why Derrida is right to leave open 
the possibility that by Handschrift Heidegger could also mean non-phonetic forms of inscription. 
Commenting on the passage cited above from the Parmenides lecture, Derrida writes: 
 
[Handwriting] is immediately bound to speech, or, what is more likely, to a system of 
phonetic writing, unless what gathers together Wort, zeigen, and Zeichen does not 
necessarily pass through the voice and unless the speech Heidegger speaks of here is 
essentially distinct from all phoné (Derrida 2008, 47). 
 
Speech and the voice are not mentioned in this section of the Parmenides lecture. Heidegger 
refers only to the word (Wort) as writing (Schrift), and to writing as handwriting (Handschrift). 
Now handwriting is at one point interpreted in terms of an essential correlation between the hand, 
the figure drawn in space, that is, the graphic symbol, and the gaze that reads it. Logos in this 
context is made to signify both reading (Lesen) and being (Sein).  
 
Being, word, gathering (Lese), writing denote an original essential nexus, to which the 
showing-writing hand (die zeigend-schreibende Hand) belongs (P 85).   
 
The essential correlation of the hand and the word “as the essential distinguishing mark of man” 
is revealed in this: the hand discloses what was concealed in that it shows (in dem sie zeigt) and, 
showing, it draws (zeichnet); drawing, the hand shapes into figures the marks that show or reveal 
(die zeigenden Zeichen zu Gebilden bildet).  
 
These figures are called, following the verb graphein, grammata. The word (Wort) that is 
shown (gezeigte) through the hand and appearing in such drawing (Zeichnung) is writing 
(Schrift) (P 84). 
 
The writing of the hand is a writing for the eyes (rather than for the voice, i.e., phonetic writing). 
It indexes the origin of the human being or the world. But in two quite different, although 
inseparable, senses of “origin,” in the ontologico-existential and historico-paleontological sense.  
 
a. “Origin” in the ontologico-existential sense. What distinguishes writing and, correlatively, the 
writing hand, is not simply the fact that the graphic symbol reveals entities. The inscription of the 
first figure on the surface of a cave wall, the incision of the first line or dot in bone or stone, or 
the first marking on the legs and breasts of the human body, produces a written symbol, a 
grapheme. Doubtless, this grapheme evokes a mythopoetic content, a cosmotheological plot that 
indicates the community’s understanding of its relation with the gods (among other things). But, 
beyond its narrative content, the grapheme also testifies to something else, to something formal: 
first, to the disclosure of a world; second, to itself as an entity that projects meaning, a world, for 
the manifestation of entities, including man, the gods, and their relationship.  
 
The grapheme does not only reveal a world. It reveals itself as an entity in the world that reveals 
a world. As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it in Painting in the Grotto, it is “the spacing by which man is 
brought into the world, and by which the world itself is a world: the event of all presence in its 
absolute strangeness” (Nancy 1996, 72).  
 
Entities appear as a whole, they are made conspicuous in their entirety, when one is no longer 
able to say anything about them except that they are. That is why Heidegger says in The Origin 
of the Work of Art that the experience in which entities refuse to make themselves intelligible to 
us beyond the sheer fact that they are is “the beginning of the clearing” (PLT 53-54).  
 
The origin of the clearing might be understood by reference to a trauma of a specific sort: the 
shock of being there pure and simple, which causes language and meaning to slip away and 
entities as a whole to crowd in in their total strangeness. Now this experience of the origin of the 
clearing is, thanks to the writing hand, inscribed in a being, a grapheme.  
 
The grapheme is, in this sense, a figure that shelters (verbirgt) Dasein. It both conceals and 
preserves the manifestation of the whole as a possibility. It testifies to the trauma of the origin. 
But, conversely, there is no trauma that has not already inscribed itself in a being, externalized 
itself in space or history. The shock of being there pure and simple, the revelation of entities in 
their entirety in their total strangeness, is not directly experienced. But it is, nevertheless, already 
there, it is inscribed in a grapheme, in a mnemic trace, in the voice of the other (see Caruth 
1996); it is incised in a body or painted on a wall – in short, it is there beyond the threshold of 
consciousness as a past possibility that was never present, or as a possibility that is yet to come or 
come back in the form of nightmares or hallucinations, spectres, demons, or gods.     
 
That is to say that there is history (Geschichte), truth or Dasein from the moment there is writing 
(Handschrift).   
 
b. “Origin” in the historico-paleontological sense. But when does writing in this sense begin?  
 
Leroi-Gourhan distinguishes between two kinds of language. There is the language of the face, 
i.e., speech, that relates to hearing and that appears, together with the fabrication and use of 
movable implements, with the acquisition of bipedal locomotion two million years ago; and there 
is the language of the hand, i.e., graphism, that relates to seeing and whose symbols the hand 
produces and distributes in space.  
 
Leroi-Gourhan contends that we cannot be certain that the language and techniques of early 
hominids were anything other than the products of a vital imperative. It is likely that their speech 
did not bear on matters that extend beyond survival and play (as in non-hominid animals) before 
the invention of graphism forty thousand years ago.  
 
No reliable evidence available to date, with the exception of records relating to the most 
recent period, suggests that early anthropoids performed other than vital operating 
sequences. If language really sprang from the same source as technics, we are entitled to 
visualize language too in the form of operating sequences limited to the expression of 
concrete situations, at first concurrently with them and later involving the deliberate 
preservation and reproduction of verbal sequences going beyond immediate situations 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 115-116).6 
 
Everything seems to suggest that the liberation from the imperative of survival, the appearance of 
the symbolic, and the emergence of Homo sapiens took place simultaneously with the invention 
of graphism. In Leroi-Gourhan’s eyes, something radically new happens when the hand becomes 
the creator of images, when it organizes figures in radial patterns on cave walls, when it 
distributes symbols in space that are not directly dependent on the progression of speech in time, 
or when it cuts dots and lines in bone or stone that are apparently expressive of rhythms. 
 
[N]othing comparable to the writing and reading of symbols existed before the dawn of 
Homo sapiens (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 188). 
 
The consciousness of death seems to be the reason for this dramatic turn of events, that is, for the 
suspension of the imperative of survival, in the evolution of the hominid.  
 
Archaeological evidence of such activity [of symbolization]–which goes beyond technical 
motor function–is elusive for the early Quaternary, but by the Palaeoanthropian stage 
some archaeological evidence begins to become available. These activities, the earliest of 
an aesthetic or religious character, can be classified in two groups as reactions to death 
and reactions to shapes of an unusual or unexpected kind (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 107).      
 
We might wonder whether both groups presuppose the type of phenomenon that can be described 
as responsiveness to strangeness. If certain shapes in nature are seen as unusual or unexpected, 
then what must already have been seen as most unusual, unexpected and uncanny is the human 
being exposed to death, to the imminence of “that against which nothing can avail,” in Ismene’s 
famous words in Antigone.   
 
Moreover, we know that writing and the consciousness of death are structurally linked in at least 
two related ways. The meaning of the words I use, once I have written them down and they have 
left my hands, is no longer under the control or authority of what I meant or intended by them, of 
my intentionality or consciousness, but is at the mercy of others. This attests to my finitude and 
mortality, as does the fact that the words I write on a piece of paper, or the figures I draw on a 
wall, can survive me. There is no writing that doesn’t harbour as a possibility the awareness of 
death and, consequently, the shock of being there pure and simple, the revelation of entities as a 
whole in their utter strangeness.  
 
If the clearing has its existential origin in the traumatic experience where entities refuse to make 
themselves intelligible to us beyond the sheer fact that they are, this experience becomes possible 
with the production of the first grapheme. From the moment the hands are able to create and 
distribute figures in space, Dasein is there as a possibility. 
 
3.3 The end of graphism 
I have said something about the origin of graphism. Let me say something about its end. To this 
end, I return to the Parmenides lecture where Heidegger engages in a critique of the typewriter. 
This critique of the mechanization of writing, and of “the destruction of the word,” can be read as 
a description of the forgetting of graphism in the history of writing that begins with the birth of 
the Homo sapiens forty thousand years ago.  
 
That is why this critique cannot be reduced to the rather bland claim that “the typewriter makes 
everyone look the same” in virtue of the fact that the typed word, being uniformly the same on 
every writing machine, effaces the singular style of one’s handwriting and thus of one’s character 
or selfhood (P 81). Heidegger’s critique is without doubt a devalorization of writing. But it is not 
a devalorization of “writing in general,” as Derrida (2008, 48) suggests, but of two particular 
forms of writing, phonetic writing and the mechanization of writing through the typewriter and 
the printing press.  
 
Since the hand that writes envelops the essence of language, the disappearance of the hand in the 
production of written symbols by the writing machine and the printing press deprives language of 
its essence.   
 
The typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand, i.e., the realm of the 
word. … Mechanical writing deprives the hand of its rank in the realm of the written 
word and degrades the word to a means of communication (P 81).  
 
The disappearance of the hand turns language into a vehicle of communication, a means of 
exchange or commerce (Verkehrsmittel). It is as if the mechanization of writing in the modern 
era continued a process that started five thousand years ago with the device of linearity, 
phonetization and, subsequently, alphabetization. These three techniques define modern writing 
in distinction from graphism.  
 
Graphism, Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 200) tells us, is multidimensional. It is a technology that from 
the start combined art and religion by giving language “the dimension of the inexpressible–the 
possibility of multiplying the dimensions of a fact in instantly accessible visual symbols” (Leroi-
Gourhan 1993, 200).7 Linear writing, by contrast, is one-dimensional. It conforms to the pattern 
of speech that emits sounds in the dimension of time conceived as a series of nows. Unlike 
graphism, which symbolizes figures and rhythms, linear writing represents sounds. The device of 
linearity subordinates graphic to phonetic expression. It produces the system of phonetic writing.  
 
Linear writing arises with settled agricultural life, with the birth of the city or civilization, with 
the accumulation of capital and goods, as a system of elementary bookkeeping and genealogical 
record. As the forgetting of Handschrift, linear writing testifies to the epoché of being.   
 
4. Technicity and life 
I have shown that writing is the origin of Dasein both in an existential-ontological and historico-
paleontological sense. Following the second sense of the term, the question is how far this 
naturalization of Dasein–understood as the relation between being and the human being, and, by 
implication, the Gestell, the setup between being and the human being–can be taken. I argue in 
this final section that there is a limit to the possibility of naturalizing Dasein on the ground that 
there is an irreducible phenomenological sense in which life is experienced.  
 
4.1 Anthropogenesis  
There seems, then, to be more than a fortuitous connection between two of the meanings of the 
Latin rectus, the sense of being erect, straight or upright, of standing straight on two feet, and 
being correct or right, correctness of judgment, truth, in other words, the quality of understanding 
things as such, openness to entities. Bipedalism and transcendence: the former, I have suggested, 
is a necessary ontical condition of possibility of the latter. Apes have no hands, that is to say, 
they cannot write, because they are not bipedal; and it is thanks to the drawn figure and the 
drawing hand that Dasein, the community of the human being with being, is there as a 
possibility.  
 
Now graphism is a stage in the process of hominization, and this in turn is a moment in the 
history of life on earth. Is Dasein, too, then, a moment in the history of life on earth?  
 
Since this inference does not go without saying, I will explore this question in this final section. 
To begin with, what does life mean here? Leroi-Gourhan does not consider the meaning or 
essence of life in Gesture and Speech or elsewhere. But it is possible to distil a sense of it from 
the text.  
 
Leroi-Gourhan rarely focuses on biological structures (excepting the brain) in the text. He also 
does not evoke vital properties and he explicitly rejects Teilhard de Chardin’s vitalism. His 
principal focus is on actions performed by organs, on the mechanical movements performed by 
the skeleton, and on a process of exteriorization according to which such actions and movements 
are transferred to tools and machines. We can call this process technicity. It describes the process 
of anthropogenesis. As I intend to show, it issues directly from the hominid anatomy.     
 
Leroi-Gourhan does not often use the term technicity. At any rate, he does not use it with a 
precise meaning. By technicity I do not mean techniques, tools, or machines; the sum total of 
things made by man as opposed to things made by nature; the production and use of things; or 
Heidegger’s notion of Gestell, the mutual challenge of man and being. I have in mind the process 
of hominization that starts with the acquisition of erect posture two million years ago. Leroi-
Gourhan first came across this process when he described the tool in Milieu and Technics as “the 
externalization of an efficient gesture” (Leroi-Gourhan 1971, 318).  
 
One of the more striking aspects of human evolution is the liberation of the tool, the 
substitution of natural tools for movable and more efficient artificial tools. From the first 
evidence of technical activity, the actions of hammering, cutting, and scratching are 
materialised as tools (Leroi-Gourhan 1971, 44). 
 
To make a tool is not to endow a determinate material with a specific form, as classical thought 
teaches. It is to externalize a technical action. To make a hammer or a pair of scissors, an index 
card roller or a calculator, is to externalize the action of hammering or cutting, of memorizing or 
calculating.  
 
Physical objects in the environment and memory are also subject to this process. The physical 
world is externalized in language, and memory is transferred to the ethnic group. 
 
The whole of our evolution has been oriented toward placing outside ourselves what in 
the rest of the animal is achieved inside by species adaptation. The most striking material 
fact is certainly the ‘freeing’ of tools, but the fundamental fact is really the freeing of the 
word and our unique ability to transfer our memory to a social organism outside ourselves 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 235).   
 
It is thanks to this process of externalization, and, consequently, thanks to the development of 
language, techniques and social memory–a development that follows a rhythm other than that of 
the phyletic stream–that the hominid gradually freed itself from the constraints of zoological 
evolution. Over the course of the Pleistocene era, the development of language, techniques and 
social memory, central to ethnic differentiation, gradually took over from the phylum the role of 
being the main regulating factor in human evolution.   
 
Now technicity is only a stage in the evolution of life on earth. The determining factor of 
evolution for Leroi-Gourhan is locomotion.8 The move from the aquatic element to the terrestrial 
medium, the release from crawling, and the acquisition of bipedalism constitute different stages – 
or successive liberations – in the achievement of a balance between “mobility and capacity for 
survival” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 26). Since nutrition in animals is connected with the search for 
food, it involves the use of mobile capturing organs and a detection mechanism. Mobility implies 
that the organs of prehension, of food preparation, and of ingestion are situated in front of the 
body. This polarization of organs is what led to the formation of an anterior field divided into a 
manual and facial pole, forelimb and face, “which act in close relationship to perform the most 
elaborate technical operations” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 31).  
 
The history of life beginning with the fish in the Palaeozoic era to the contemporary human and 
the invention of the index card in the early 20th century is the history of this relationship between 
the face and the forelimb. Erect posture is itself one of the solutions to a biological problem as 
old as the vertebrates themselves, “that of the relationship between the face as bearer of the 
organs of nourishment and the forelimb as an organ not only of locomotion but also of 
prehension” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 19).  
 
Some vertebrates use their forelimbs exclusively for locomotion. Among these (horse, pig, goat), 
the facial organs are specialized in the extreme – as if the facial pole was compensating for the 
non-intervention of the manual pole in the technical activities of survival, including food capture 
and preparation, attack and defense. From the moment the forelimb ceases to intervene altogether 
in locomotion, hands emerge together with tools and speech. It is not merely that some of the 
technical operations necessary for survival are transferred from the facial pole to the manual 
pole, as happens in the case of vertebrates with a mixed quadrupedal and seated posture (rat, 
squirrel, monkey). Rather, all of the technical operations are transferred outwards, externalized as 
tools and language and memory.   
 
This means that the single most important effect of skeletal adaptation to bipedal locomotion is 
the functional non-specialization of the facial and manual poles.  
 
If the hand of the earliest anthropoid had become a tool by adaptation, the result would 
have been a group of mammals particularly well equipped to perform a restricted series of 
actions: It would not have been the human being. Our significant genetic trait is physical 
(and mental) nonadaptation: a tortoise when we retire beneath a roof, a crab when we 
hold out a pair of pliers, a horse when we bestride a mount. We are again and again 
available for new forms of action, our memory transferred to books, our strength 
multiplied in the ox, our fist improved in the hammer (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 245-6, 118). 
 
Technical actions would not have been externalized as tools had the hominid anatomy been 
adapted to perform a restricted number of actions. It is the absence of anatomical specialization 
that makes possible the evolution of the hominid by non-organic or technical means.  
 
Since graphism is a stage in the history of life on earth, and Dasein ontically depends on 
graphism, it follows that Dasein is a moment in the history of life on earth, too, and, more 
narrowly, in the history of the becoming-human of the hominid.  
 
4.2 The phenomenalization of life 
Matters are not so simple, however. Let us recall what life means for Leroi-Gourhan. It refers to a 
set of complex ontical processes: the process of hominization, for instance, or what I have called 
technicity; it also refers to the functional evolution of the manual and facial poles of the 
vertebrate body. Now what makes such a notion of life possible?  
 
No doubt, its meaning depends on whether it agrees with empirical data, on whether it is possible 
to generate true propositions about living beings by means of it, or on whether it is possible to 
generalize to most if not to all instances of life in the world.    
 
At the same time, however, this notion of life is the correlate of a scientific or theoretical gaze. 
That means that it also depends on a distinctive way of conceiving life, what Heidegger calls a 
projection of meaning. The empirical data on the basis of which Leroi-Gourhan constructs his 
notion of life must fit within a prior projection or holistic understanding of life, however vague or 
inarticulate that understanding may be. For it is only thanks to this understanding that the data in 
question pertain to the domain of life (rather than, say, to the domain of physics or chemistry). 
Although empirically undetermined, this holistic understanding of life is something that Dasein 
accomplishes, or more accurately perhaps, the differentiation between the categories of the living 
and the non-living is something determined historically by the Gestell.  
 
This means that one of the background conditions of Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of life is the failure 
to call being into question. This notion of life feeds off the forgetting of being. Life in the sense 
in which Leroi-Gourhan talks about it would be unthinkable outside the context of the modern 
age that is constituted by the total lack of questioning or the indifference to being.  
 
Put differently, the history of life of which Dasein is a moment presupposes a space of meaning 
in which this history can appear or be the history that Leroi-Gourhan describes. It presupposes a 
sense of life that cannot be translated in the terms of a naturalist discourse. This is a sense of life 
that Heidegger carves out in his reading of Heraclitus’ fragment B16 in an essay titled Aletheia. 
Let me briefly present this sense of life in Heidegger’s essay before making some concluding 
remarks.  
 
Heidegger’s argument in the essay is that an experience of aletheia underlies and can be 
discerned in the way phusis is conceived in the fragment as the “never-setting” such that no one 
can hide from it. After identifying the “never-setting” with phusis, and describing the experience 
of phusis in fragment B123 as the revealing that loves to conceal itself, Heidegger returns to 
fragment B16 with the proposal to replace the expression “never-setting” with the expression 
“ever-rising.” He then writes:  
 
According to our interpretation, we can replace to me dunon pote with to aei phuon on 
two conditions. We must think phusis from self-concealing, and we must think phuon as a 
verb (EGT 115). 
 
Heidegger recognizes that the word aeiphuon is not to be found in the surviving fragments of 
Heraclitus. Instead, the expression we find is “ever-living,” immerwährend lebend, aeizoon, in 
fragment B30.  
 
How is life (leben) understood here? Heidegger approvingly cites Nietzsche’s note from 1885/6. 
The note says:  
 
“‘Being’–we have no conception of it other than as ‘life.’–How can something dead 
‘be’?”  
 
Life is a metonym for being. But in what sense? After a brief analysis of the root za- in Homer 
and Pindar, Heidegger explains that to live is to arise (Aufgehen) or appear (Erscheinen). This 
sense of life is not restricted to animals. Gods too are alive in this sense. They come into view by 
casting their gaze about. Animals, by contrast, appear in their being captive to their drives or 
instinctual behaviour.   
 
What is named in the Greek zoon lies so far from any biologically conceived animality 
that the Greeks could even call their gods zoa. How so? Those who cast their gaze about 
are those who rise into view. The gods are not experienced as animals. But animality does 
belong to zoe in a special sense. The rising of animals into the open remains closed and 
sealed in itself in a strangely captivating way (EGT 116). 
 
After examining a few more keywords in Heraclitus’ fragments, Heidegger concludes that life, 
fire, and world say the same. They mean what preserves all coming (alles Kommen verwahrt) 
(EGT117). Conceived as a verb rather than as a noun, irreducible, therefore, to a thing that lives, 
whether human or god, animal or plant, life signifies movement and light. It is the movement of 
phenomenalization.    
 
Why does this movement have a proclivity for self-concealment? Why does phusis love to hide? 
For anything to appear, it must do so as something. It must be identifiable as this or as that. But 
appearing is not an entity. It has none of the properties by which an entity can be identified. It 
cannot, therefore, appear. Or rather, appearing is a movement that is present in beings as self-
veiling or in withdrawal, as a lack or absence. Being other than the totality of entities, their 
appearing has the character of something foreign or strange, not in a relative but in an absolute 
sense. It remains unidentifiable, as if it were reluctant to show itself.  
 
Life is light. The more it is intense, the more it obtrudes, and the more overwhelming is the shock 
of beings thronging around one as an undifferentiated whole. Life, felt in its absolute intensity 
and strangeness, causes the outline of beings to recede. Language and meaning slip away, and all 
that remains is the sheer fact that they are.  
 
That is why the veil is necessary. Life is self-veiling so that beings can be articulated and 
determined in language and delimited against each other. That is how Heidegger interprets 
Heraclitus’ polemos in fragment 53, that is, both as light (Lichtung) and as differentiation (Aus-
einander-setzung). It is close to the movement of life that Renaud Barbaras (2012, 128-29) 
describes in On Nature: life as the power that detaches a thing from that which surrounds it and 
with which it was initially fused, or that delimits a thing against that which it is not–as in 
fragment 53 where mortals and immortals, free men and slaves are set back against each another.   
 
I have argued in this chapter that there is no transcendence without bipedalism, no Dasein 
without graphism, and that the inference to be drawn from this is irreducibly equivocal. For if it 
follows from this that Dasein is a part of the history of life on earth, there is a sense in which this 
history of life is the correlate of a scientific practice that presupposes a world that is discursively 
articulated with a specific understanding of being. Scientific activity and conceptualization 
presuppose a decreased intensity of life. There is, in other words, no history of life in Leroi-
Gourhan’s sense without the self-veiling of life that Heidegger talks about in Aletheia.  
 
Dasein is a part of the history of life. The history of life is a part of the Gestell or Dasein. I am 
not sure whether there is a way out of this aporia.   
 
Bibliography 
Barbaras, Renaud. 2012. On Nature. The Yearbook of Comparative Literature 58:122-130.  
Caruth, Cathy. 1996. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore and 
London: The johns Hopkins University. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1997. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  
---. 2008. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II. Ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth 
Rottenberg. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.     
Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1993. Gesture and Speech. Trans. Anna Bostock Berger. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.  
---. 1973. Milieu et technique. Paris: Albin Michel. 
Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.  
Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1996. The Muses. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press.  
 
  
1 An early draft of this paper was presented at the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Antwerp in April 2017. I would like to thank Peter Reynaert for his kind and generous invitation 
as well as the students and staff present for their questions and comments. I am also grateful to the 
editors of this volume for their feedback and comments on earlier drafts of this piece.  
2 The word ‘hominid’ should be understood to refer to any creature with erect posture, a short face 
and free hands during locomotion. The human being or Homo sapiens is a type of hominid, a 
species of the genus Homo.    
3 This kind of inquiry seems to be what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of metontology in 
his lecture on Leibniz. See MFL 157.  
																																																								
																																																																																																																																																																																			
4 The subject-object relation becomes a ruse, Heidegger insists in The Question Concerning 
Technology, employed by man to conceal from himself the extent to which he has already 
become a resource in the service of the market economy. See BW 332.  
5 Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 246) describes the industrial age by reference to the withdrawal of the 
hand from the activity of producing force or motion: “Having set the process in motion, the hand 
no longer intervenes except to feed or stop the machine.” This is one step away from the end of 
the human adventure with the creation of an artificial intelligence capable of having feelings and 
urges and of reproducing itself. See Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 248-9). 
6 It is beyond me why Bernard Stiegler (1998, 166) would read into this and similar passages the 
kind of empiricist theory of concept that Hegel criticizes in the chapter on sense-certainty in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. By “immediate” or “concrete” Leroi-Gourhan does not mean “non-
inferentially given,” or “individual,” but “vital.” Nothing Leroi-Gourhan says rules out that the 
same verbal sequences are used recursively in similar “vital” or “immediate” situations, and that 
a word, and, hence, too, the idea it expresses, is from the start general. In the cited passage, 
Leroi-Gourhan is saying that a verbal sequence that is at first used strictly in vital situations can, 
at a later developmental stage, be used in situations that are not governed by the imperative of 
survival.   
7 Leroi-Gourhan’s (1993, 202) example: “A cross next to a lance and a reed with a sponge on the 
end of it are enough to convey the idea of the Passion of Christ. The figure has nothing to do with 
phoneticized oral notation, but it has an extensibility such as no writing can have. It contains 
every possibility of oral exteriorization, from the word ‘passion’ to the most complex 
commentaries on Christian metaphysics. Ideography in this form precedes pictography 
[characteristic of Egyptian, Chinese, and Aztec writing], and all Paleolithic art is ideographic.”  
8 “It is possible to regard mobility as the significant feature of evolution toward the human state” 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 26). Derrida (1997, 84-85) rightly criticizes Leroi-Gourhan’s retrospective 
teleological and anthropocentric view of life.   
